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The Dyson Game
Rene´ Carmona, Mark Cerenzia∗, Aaron Zeff Palmer†
Abstract
We introduce an explicitly solvable N player dynamic game that admits Dyson Brownian
motion as a Nash equilibrium and investigate consequences of its many atypical properties. We
find that game theoretic symmetry for the naturally ordered players requires selfish behavior
and moreover depends on the information available to them. Most significantly, the universality
class of the equilibrium depends on this information structure and not just on the form of cost
players face, in contrast to the folklore that this dependence should disappear as N → ∞
given mean field interactions. The game theoretic symmetry in turn allows us to establish
strong localized convergence of the N–Nash system to the expected mean field master equation
against locally optimal player ensembles, i.e., those in the Nash–optimal universality class. This
convergence notably features a nonlocal–to–local transition in the population dependence.
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1 Introduction
In the random matrix theory (RMT) community, there is a well known study [42] by physicists
Krba´lek and Sˇeba arguing that the spacing and arrival statistics of buses on a route in Cuernavaca,
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Mexico are well-described by the eigenvalues of a random matrix belonging to the Gaussian unitary
ensemble (GUE), which have a repulsive density on RN , N ≥ 2, proportional to∏
1≤k<`<N
|x` − xk|βe−N−12
∑N
i=1(x
i)2 , β = 2. (1)
Although the repulsion parameter choice β = 2 is related to the very special algebraic structure of
determinantal correlations and to “symmetry class” (see Chapter 1 of Forrester [35]), there have been
many studies identifying the emergence of such statistics for general β > 0, often where repulsive
dynamics are natural: among parked cars [1, 33, 57, 61], pedestrians [41], perched birds [62], and
even the New York City subway system [40] (such statistics have also appeared in a geographical
study [51] of France, in genetics [53], and perhaps most notably among gaps between zeros of the
Riemann zeta function [56], which has already generated much research in number theory).
There have been some direct attempts to explain these observations through rigorous mathe-
matics, such as Baik–Borodin–Deift–Suidan [5] and Baik [4], but a common theme among these
real–world studies has largely been ignored: each involves players optimizing in a setting that is
readily interpretable as game theoretic. The recent numerical physics paper [72] of Warcho l appears
to be the only study of an agent-based model attempting to investigate this connection.
Motivated to prove rigorous theorems on this implicit link, we introduce a dynamic N player
game whose closed and open loop models are explicitly solvable with Nash–optimal trajectories
given by Dyson Brownian motion (24), first introduced in [32] by Freeman Dyson; we accordingly
call it the Dyson game. More precisely, players in this prototype game aim to minimize a long
time average (“ergodic”) cost based on their distance from the origin and on the squared reciprocal
distance between one another (similar to Calogero–Moser–Sutherland models; cf. Remark 3.3).
Merely constructing an agent–based model or a genuine player–based game yielding RMT–type
statistics is not difficult, but it is significant for us to be able to identify how the solution depends on
player information and how the freedom to act individually can achieve “game theoretic symmetry”
despite the natural ordering in equilibrium. This latter feature is qualitatively consistent with the
motivating example of the buses of Cuernavaca as well as the other observational studies above. It
turns out such symmetry fails in the open loop model but is present in the closed loop model of
“full information” (Section 4.1) allowing us to pursue strong “localized” convergence (Section 7).
Open loop models are often easier to analyze because opponent reactions may not be considered
by players in their search for a Nash equilibrium. The open loop model for the Dyson game is further
simplified by its potential structure (Lemma 3.7) that reduces the search to a single auxiliary global
problem: a “central planner” can tell every player what to do and they end up not acting selfishly
(though a priori they could). This puts us in the realm of classical physics, but to continue the game
theoretic interpretation, the open loop Nash equilibrium prescribes higher repulsion to accommodate
players densely packed near the origin. In contrast, the closed loop model realizes the option to
behave selfishly through consideration of opponent reactions, leading to a less repulsive equilibrium
that benefits players near the edge. Thus, the closed loop equilibrium is more “fair” in that all
players incur the same cost, but this cost is higher than the average open loop cost; see Figure 1.
Further, both folklore and rigorous results of game theory suggest that the difference between
these two models should disappear as N →∞ given mean field interactions; see Remark 2.27 and
pgs.122, 212 in Carmona–Delarue [21] for discussion of explicit solutions, as well as the forthcoming
work of Lacker [45] for a theoretical approach. The intuition is that a single player cannot dra-
matically influence another through the empirical distribution if N is large. However, in the Dyson
game, the singular dependence on the population allows nearby neighbors to have a large impact on
a given player’s cost, and so the difference between the closed and open loop Nash equilibriums does
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not disappear in the limit (cf. Section 4.1). Consequently, the universality class of the equilibrium
depends on player information, not just on the form of cost they face. We believe this result offers
a new perspective on Problem 9 of Deift’s list [29]; see the end of Section 4.1 for a discussion.
By design, the solutions (9), (21) to the ergodic Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations
(8),(20) associated to the search for a Nash equilibrium can (essentially) each be expressed with a
single functional (39), (43) on Wasserstein space, and so we are able to guess the limiting mean-field
equations (40), (42). The so–called master equation (40) in particular allows us to formulate a mean
field game (MFG) analog of the Dyson game, whose analysis requires navigating nontrivial issues of
gradient flows on Wasserstein space. However, the connection between these two regimes remains
formal without more work. Thus, we carry out a localized version of the convergence program for
fully informed players introduced in Remark (x) following Theorem 2.3 of the seminal work [50] of
Lasry and Lions. By “localized”, we mean we consider sequences of equations from the N–Nash
system (8) for individual ranked players, and in doing so we rigorize the intuition that players really
only care about the population at their mean field “location” for large N . Further, this convergence
holds against player ensembles that are locally optimal, i.e., in the Nash–optimal universality class.
For this localized convergence of equations, the main calculation Proposition 7.1 is an extension
of a guess in Remark 3.9 of Gorin–Shkolnikov [37], made at the edge, to any sequence of players
under a convex potential. To prove it, we do not need to rely on detailed local limit behavior in
the bulk, such as sine kernel asymptotics [3] or more generally the Sineβ process [68, 69], despite
their clear relevance to such calculations (cf. Remark 7.3). This result implies that the control
cost term does not converge in L2 to 0 in the bulk (as the Euler–Lagrange equation (71) might
contrastingly suggest), instead contributing a local term in the limit. Indeed, we believe these
considerations improve our understanding of limits that arise naturally in the RMT literature, such
as the heuristic limit (1.4.4) of Biane–Speicher [13] for relative free Fisher information (cf. Remarks
5.4 and 7.7). However, the main finding here is that the local contributions in the bulk from the
diffusion and drift–interaction terms of the N–Nash system (8) cancel, leaving only the control cost
term to contribute, which yields the expected master equation (40) (see Theorem 7.5).
There has been a growing interest in explicit solutions to N player games, in the mean field
convergence problem, and in rank–based systems. As Lacker–Zariphopoulou [46] recently point
out, explicit solutions for N player games are scarce, especially for the setting of full information. A
solvable prototype for this setting is the class of Linear–Quadratic (LQ) models, examples of which
are reviewed in Section 2.4 of [21]; see [46] and references therein for some non–LQ but explicitly
solvable models. The work of Bardi [7] is an informative explicit case–study in the Gaussian ergodic
setting, but it is rarely remarked that the model works with “narrow strategies” (see Fischer [34]).
For the convergence problem, the early works [7, 34, 44] consider open loop and narrow strategies,
but much research on convergence for closed loop models with full information has been generated
by the systematic approach of Cardaliaguet–Delarue–Lasry–Lions [19]; see the forthcoming work of
Lacker [45] and references therein. Finally, there are many models in the literature that include costs
depending on rank, e.g. [9, 10, 22, 55], but the player states are still designed to be exchangeable.
The Dyson game exhibits many interesting properties that are atypical, if not new, for the
literature on many–player games. First, the Dyson game is a non–LQ but explicitly solvable N
player model that involves singular convolution transforms of the empirical distribution. Second,
the model naturally features nonlocal–to–local transition in the population argument of the N–Nash
system as N → ∞ (see Cardaliaguet [18] for more general discussion of such transitions). Third,
the singular cost term produces a singular drift in equilibrium and a quadratic dependence on the
local density in the master equation (40). Fourth, the difference between the closed and open loop
models of the Dyson game does not vanish in the limit and thus the models correspond to different
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universality classes. Fifth and finally, we believe this paper is the first to work directly with the
naturally ordered players and to establish convergence of equations in such a strong localized sense.
Outline
After introducing frequently used notation in Section 2, we articulate the closed and open loop
models for the Dyson game in Section 3 and then use the solutions (9), (21) of the ergodic HJBs
(8), (20) to prove Verification Theorems 4.2, 4.5 in Section 4. In Section 5, we use the mean
field analogs (39),(43) of these solutions to guess the limiting equations (40),(42) on Wasserstein
space; most notably, the master equation (40) features a local coupling. Then, using the theory of
gradient flows, Section 6 proves a Verification Theorem 6.4 for the associated MFG formulation.
Finally, Section 7 justifies the passage to the limit by establishing a strong localized convergence of
equations against player ensembles in the Nash–optimal universality class. In addition, Section 8
quickly reviews the analogous results when the players live in the periodic setting of the circle.
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2 Notation
We often make use of the abbreviation “
∑
k:k 6=i” for “
∑N
k=1,k 6=i” when N ≥ 2 is implicitly fixed.
We write P(R) for the set of probability measures µ on R, P2(R) for the subset with finite second
moment,
∫
R |x|2µ(dx) <∞, and Pp(R) for the subset with densities m(x) in Lp(R), p > 0. We also
write Pp2 (R) := P2(R) ∩ Pp(R). If T : R → R is Borel measurable, we denote the push forward of
µ ∈ P(R) by T#µ := µ ◦ T−1. We always assume P(R) to be topologized by weak convergence of
probability measures and P2(R) to be endowed with the r–Wasserstein distance with r = 2, defined
by
dr(µ, ν) := min
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
{(∫
R×R
|x− y|r γ(dx, dy)
)1/r}
, r ≥ 1,
where Γ(µ, ν) is the set of couplings γ for µ, ν ∈ P2(R).
To emphasize the nonlocal–to–local transition when passing to the limit in equations, we use
Greek letters “µ(dx), ν(dx), . . .” for probability measures and use Latin letters “m(x), n(x), . . .” for
their densities. We also use bold symbols “x,X,φ,α, . . .” to indicate vectors in RN , though the N
dependence will remain implicit. Accordingly, for any x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ RN , we write
µNx :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
δxk , µ
N,i
x :=
1
N − 1
∑
k:k 6=i
δxk
for the ordinary and ith empirical distribution of x, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , respectively. For any µ ∈ P(R)
and f ∈ L1(µ), we write µ[f ] := ∫R f(x)µ(dx) (and the same for higher dimensions). Write also
WN := {x ∈ RN : x1 < · · · < xN}
4
for the open Weyl chamber and WN for its closure. For partial derivatives, we often use the
abbreviation ∂i :=
∂
∂xi
.
For any µ ∈ P(R), consider a function h : R → R such that, for almost every x ∈ R, the
integral
∫
R h(x− y)µ(dy) exists or its principal value exists. Denote this quantity “(h ∗ µ)(x)”, the
convolution of h with µ. We will find it convenient to set for x ∈ R \ {0}
h0(x) := log |x|, h1(x) := 1/x, h2(x) := 1/x2. (2)
Then we may write the Hilbert Transform as
Hµ(x) := p.v.
∫
R
µ(dy)
x− y = lim↓0
∫
|x−y|>
µ(dy)
x− y = (h1 ∗ µ)(x). (3)
Recall there exists Ap > 0 such that ‖Hµ‖p ≤ Ap‖m‖p for all µ ∈ Pp(R), 1 < p <∞, with density
m(x) (see, e.g., Theorem 1.8.8 of Blower [15]).
Finally, for any β > 0, let µβ ∈ P(R) denote the Wigner semicircle law with density
mβ(x) :=
1
piβ
√
2β − x2 · 1[−√2β,√2β](x). (4)
Throughout the paper, (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0,P) will denote a complete filtered probability space
supporting an N -dimensional Wiener process (Wt)t≥0 in RN and any other random objects we
might need. We often write X ∼ µ to mean the random variable X has distribution µ ∈ P(R).
3 N player formulation
Closed loop model
Definition 3.1. A function φ :WN → RN is admissible if for every x0 ∈ WN , there exists a unique
strong solution (Xt)t≥0 = (X
φ
t )t≥0 to the stochastic differential equation
dXt = φ(Xt)dt+
σ√
N − 1dWt, X0 = x0, σ ≥ 0 (5)
that remains in WN and satisfies the integrability condition
E
∫ T
0
[
‖φ(Xt)‖2 + ‖Xt‖2 +
∑
1≤k<`≤N
1
(X`t −Xkt )2
]
dt <∞, for all T > 0. (6)
We denote the class of such feedbacks by A(N).
The class A(N) is fairly rich; indeed, Theorem 2.2 of Ce´pa–Le´pingle [26] offers general solvability
of (5) under the state constraint, while the stronger condition (6) will need to be checked (see
the proof of Theorem 4.2). Also, the constraint “Xt ∈ WN for all t ≥ 0” is consistent with the
framework suggested by the early work [49] of Lasry–Lions for state–constrained problems, but this
condition will be forced in most cases by the form of singular cost (see Remark 3.5).
The closed loop model for the N player Dyson game can be formulated as follows. Fix any
feedback profile φ ∈ A(N) and C ∈ R. Interpreting the components (X it)t≥0 of (5) as players, we
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accordingly define for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N the ith player’s admissible class Ai(φ−i) to be the collection
of ψ : RN → R such that (ψ,φ−i) := (φ1, . . . , φi−1, ψ, φi+1, . . . , φN) ∈ A(N). Define the state–cost
FN,i(x) :=
(xi)2
8
+ C · (h2 ∗ µ
N,i
x )(x
i)
N − 1 =
(xi)2
8
+
C
(N − 1)2
∑
k:k 6=i
1
(xi − xk)2 , x ∈ W
N , (7)
(recall the definitions in (2)). Then the search for Nash equilibria in the closed loop model requires
each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , to minimize the ergodic cost
JN,i(ψ|x0,φ−i) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
ψ(Xt)
2 + FN,i(Xt)
]
dt
over deviations ψ ∈ Ai(φ−i), subject to (Xt)t≥0 = (X(ψ,φ
−i)
t )t≥0 satisfying (5) with X0 = x0 ∈ WN .
Definition 3.2. A feedback profile φ∗ = (φ∗1, . . . , φ∗N) ∈ A(N) is a closed loop Nash equilibrium
over classes Ai ⊂ Ai(φ∗−i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , φ∗i ∈ Ai and for every x0 ∈ WN , we
have
inf
ψ∈Ai
JN,i(ψ|x0,φ∗−i) = JN,i(φ∗i|x0,φ∗−i).
Remark 3.3. A very similar expression to (7) appears in the Hamiltonian for Calogero’s model
[17]; see [6, 48, 60] for various perspectives. However, the relationship between the parameters C
and β (see Proposition 3.4 below) appears to be specific to the game theoretic construction and has
some subtle consequences; compare Remarks 3.5 and 4.3 with Remark 4.6.
We now solve explicitly the N–Nash system for the closed loop Dyson game, a system of N
ergodic Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations associated to the search for a Nash equilibrium
(compare with equation (1) of [19] and see Section 2.5.3 of [21] for some intuition):
− σ
2
2(N − 1)∆xv
N,i(x)+
∑
k:k 6=i
∂kv
N,k(x)∂kv
N,i(x)+
1
2
(∂iv
N,i)2(x) = FN,i(x)−λN,i, x ∈ WN , 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
(8)
Proposition 3.4. Assume σ ≥ 0 and that the coefficient C of (7) satisfies C ≥ −σ4/6, so we may
write C = β
2
(3
4
β − σ2) for some β ∈ R. Define
vN,iβ (x) :=
{
(xi)2
4
− β
2
(h0 ∗ µN,ix )(xi) x ∈ WN
+∞ otherwise , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (9)
and write λN,iβ :=
σ2
4(N−1) +
β
4
. Then the ergodic value pairs (vN,iβ (x), λ
N,i
β ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , form a
classical solution to the N–Nash system (8) on WN .
Proof. The proof follows by direct calculation. First we collect some facts:
∂iv
N,i
β (x) =
xi
2
− β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi), ∂2i vN,iβ (x) =
1
2
+
β
2
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi) (10)
and similarly if k 6= i
∂kv
N,i
β (x) =
β
2(N − 1)
1
xi − xk , ∂
2
kv
N,i
β (x) =
β
2(N − 1)
1
(xi − xk)2 .
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Then we can compute
− σ
2
2(N − 1)∆xv
N,i
β (x) = −
σ2
2(N − 1)
N∑
k=1
∂2kv
N,i
β (x) = −
σ2
4(N − 1) −
σ2β
2
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1
and
1
2
(∂iv
N,i
β )
2(x) =
1
2
(
xi
2
− β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
)2
=
(xi)2
8
+
β2
8
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 −
β
4
xi · (h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi) +
β2
8(N − 1)2
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:`6=i,k
1
xi − xk
1
xi − x` .
(11)
Similarly, we have∑
k:k 6=i
∂kv
N,k
β (x)∂kv
N,i
β (x) =
β
2(N − 1)
∑
k:k 6=i
(
xk
2
− β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,kx )(xk)
)
1
xi − xk
=
β2
4
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 +
β
4(N − 1)
∑
k:k 6=i
xk
xi − xk −
β2
4(N − 1)2
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:`6=k,i
1
xk − x`
1
xi − xk .
(12)
The two final terms of (11), (12) cancel by the algebra
2
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`: 6`=k,i
1
xk − x`
1
xi − xk =
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:` 6=k,i
1
xk − x`
[
1
xi − xk −
1
xi − x`
]
=
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:`6=i,k
1
xi − xk
1
xi − x` ,
(13)
while the two second–to–last terms of (11), (12) combine to yield the constant −β
4
. Putting every-
thing together completes the proof.
Remark 3.5. If C > 0, the players are forced to be state–constrained in WN by the singular costs
and not by our notion of admissibility Definition 3.1 (unless the system starts at the boundary).
But for the range 0 ≤ β ≤ 4
3
σ2, when C = β
2
(3
4
β − σ2) ≤ 0, it is only admissibility that keeps the
players in the chamber WN ; see Lasry–Lions [49] for a discussion of forced boundary conditions.
Further we can write C = κ
2
(3
4
κ − σ2) with the new parameter κ := 4
3
σ2 − β. Thus, there are at
least two sets of solutions to the N–Nash system (8): the pairs (vN,iβ (x), λ
N,i
β ) and (v
N,i
κ (x), λ
N,i
κ ),
1 ≤ i ≤ N , as defined in (9). Compare with the discussion on pgs.2-4 of Spohn [64].
Open loop model
To formulate the open loop model for the N player Dyson game, we proceed as above.
Definition 3.6. A profile (αt)t≥0 = ((α1t , . . . , α
N
t ))t≥0 of R–valued processes is admissible if it is
F–progressively measurable and for every x0 ∈ WN , there exists a unique strong solution (Xt)t≥0 =
(Xαt )t≥0 to the stochastic differential equation
dXt = αtdt+
σ√
N − 1dWt, X0 = x0, σ ≥ 0 (14)
that remains in WN and satisfies the integrability condition
E
∫ T
0
[
‖αt‖2 + ‖Xt‖2 +
∑
1≤k<`≤N
1
(X`t −Xkt )2
]
dt <∞, for all T > 0. (15)
We denote the class of such admissible strategies by A(N).
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Fix a strategy profile (αt)t≥0 ∈ A(N) and C ∈ R. Define for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N the ith player’s
admissible class Ai(α−i) to be the collection of R–valued processes (ηt)t≥0 such that
((ηt,α
−i
t ))t≥0 := ((α
1
t , . . . , α
i−1
t , ηt, α
i+1
t , . . . , α
N
t ))t≥0 ∈ A(N),
henceforth abbreviated “(η,α−i)”. Then the search for Nash equilibria in the open loop model
requires each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , to minimize the ergodic cost (recall the definition FN,i of the
state cost (7))
JN,i(η |x0,α−i) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
η2t + F
N,i(Xt)
]
dt. (16)
over deviations η ∈ Ai(α−i), subject to (Xt)t≥0 = (X(η,α
−i)
t )t≥0 satisfying (14) with X0 = x0 ∈ WN .
Note by a slight abuse, we maintain the same notation despite now working with control processes
instead of feedbacks. We omit an explicit definition of open loop Nash equilibrium since it is already
indicated by Definition 3.2.
Lemma 3.7. Define a global cost function by
FN(x) :=
‖x‖2
8
+
C
2
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 , x ∈ W
N , (17)
and corresponding global cost functional
JN(α|x0) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
‖αt‖2 + FN(Xt)
]
dt (18)
over (α)t≥0 ∈ A(N), subject to (Xt)t≥0 = (Xαt )t≥0 satisfying (14) with X0 = x0 ∈ WN . Then the
open loop model for the Dyson game is a potential game in the following sense: For any profile
(αt)t≥0 ∈ A(N) such that the limit in (18) exists, and for any deviation (ηt)t≥0 ∈ Ai(α−i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
such that the limit in (16) exists, we have
JN((η,α−i)|x0)− JN(α|x0) = JN,i(η |x0,α−i)− JN,i(αi |x0,α−i). (19)
Proof. First we calculate
N∑
`=1
∑
k:k 6=`
1
(x` − xk)2 = 2
∑
k:k 6=i
1
(xi − xk)2 +
∑
`:` 6=i
∑
k:k 6=`,i
1
(x` − xk)2 .
Then under the assumptions of the statement, a straightforward check confirms that condition (19)
holds, which exactly meets Definition 2.23 in [21] for potential game.
As indicated by the characterizing condition (19), the potential game structure of Lemma 3.7
allows us to reduce the search for an open loop Nash equilibrium to a single auxiliary global problem.
Given this setting of classical optimal control, the optimum will be achieved by strategies in closed
loop feedback form and any such candidate is characterized by a solution to the ergodic HJB
equation
− σ
2
2(N − 1) ·
1
N
∆xW (x) +
1
2N
|∇xW (x)|2 = 1
N
FN(x)− λ, x ∈ WN , (20)
(the factor of “ 1
N
” maintains the correct scale for the comparison of Section 4.1 and anticipates
taking limits). Compare the next statement with Proposition 3.4.
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Proposition 3.8. Assume σ2 ≥ 0 and that the coefficient C of (17) satisfies C ≥ −σ4/4, so we
may write C = β
4
(β − 2σ2) for some β ∈ R. Define
Wβ(x) :=
{∑N
i=1
(xi)2
4
− β
2(N−1)
∑
1≤k<`≤N log(x
` − xk) x ∈ WN
+∞ otherwise (21)
and write λNβ :=
σ2
4(N−1) +
β
8
. Then the ergodic value pair
(
Wβ(x), λ
N
β
)
forms a classical solution to
the HJB equation (20) on WN .
Proof. Recall the algebraic identities (see pg.252 of [3])
N∑
i=1
xi · (h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi) =
N
2
. (22)
and
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 =
N∑
i=1
[(h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)]2. (23)
Since ∂iWβ(x) = ∂iv
N,i
β (x), we have by (10), (22), and (23)
− σ
2
2N(N − 1)∆xWβ(x) = −
σ2
4(N − 1) −
βσ2
4
1
N
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1
and
1
2N
|∇xWβ(x)|2 = β
2
8
· 1
N
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi)2
8
− β
8
.
Remark 3.9. The same discussion of Remark 3.5 applies here. But note in the range 0 < β < 2σ2
when C < 0, the non–uniqueness for bounded below, unbounded above solutions to the ergodic HJB
(20) does not contradict Theorem 3.1 of Barles–Meireles [8] because in this range the “righthandside”
FN(x) of the ergodic HJB (20) is no longer bounded below; however, FN(x) trivially becomes
bounded below in the critical case C = 0, i.e., β = 0, 2σ2! This apparent contradiction of non–
uniqueness with Theorem 3.1 of [8] evaporates when we recall the state constraint and integrability
condition (15) imposed in our notion of admissibility Definition 3.6.
4 Verification theorems
Closed loop model
Assume that the coefficient C from (7) can be written C = β
2
(3
4
β−σ2) > −σ4/8 for some β > σ2 > 0.
Then, by Proposition 3.4, the set of solution pairs (9) to the N–Nash system (8) furnishes a feedback
profile φ∗β(x) := (−∂ivN,iβ (x))Ni=1 with trajectories (X∗t )t≥0 given by β/σ2-Dyson Brownian motion:
dX∗it = −∂ivN,iβ (X∗t )dt+
σ√
N − 1dW
i
t =
[
β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,iX∗t )(X
∗i
t )−
X∗it
2
]
dt+
σ√
N − 1dW
i
t . (24)
Since β > σ2, (X∗t )t≥0 remains in the interiorWN for all t > 0, even if X∗0 = x0 ∈ WN (see [25, 59]),
but we still need to check that φ∗β satisfies the integrability condition (6).
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Remark 4.1. The appearance of the ratio β/σ2 < ∞ (the “inverse temperature”) in the name
for the dynamics (24) is justified by the form of invariant distribution (28) below. Our notion
of admissibility, Definition 3.1, prevents the case of infinite temperature β/σ2 = 0, or “complete
independence”, from occurring for the Dyson game, even in a limiting sense, because the critical
case “β = σ2” can only be interpreted through the limit β ↓ σ2, as we will see. However, essentially
all the results of this paper continue to hold verbatim in the deterministic case σ2 = 0, when there
is no temperature β/σ2 =∞ and thus the equilibrium state is “frozen”; see Remark (4.4).
For (x, αi) ∈ WN × R, write the cost as
fN,iβ (x, α
i) :=
(αi)2
2
+
(xi)2
8
+
β
2
(
3
4
β − σ2
)
· (h2 ∗ µ
N,i
x )(x
i)
N − 1 (25)
Note the Hamiltonian of player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given for (x,yi,α) ∈ WN × RN × RN by
H iβ(x,y
i,α) :=
N∑
k=1
yikαk + fN,iβ (x, α
i). (26)
The following Verification Theorem is proven in detail because of the non–uniqueness observed in
Remark 3.5 and, somewhat surprisingly, its content supports our proof of Proposition 7.1, the main
technical calculation for the localized mean field limit in Section 7.
Theorem 4.2. Fix β > σ2 > 0 in (25) and recall from Proposition 3.4 the solution pairs (vN,iβ (x), λ
N,i
β ),
1 ≤ i ≤ N , to the N–Nash system (8). Fix an interior initial condition x0 ∈ WN . Then for β > σ2,
φ∗β(x) := (−∂ivN,iβ (x))Ni=1 is a closed loop Nash equilibrium over the classes Ai ⊂ Ai(φ∗−iβ ) of devi-
ations ψi(x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , such that (Xt)t≥0 = (X(ψ
i,φ∗−iβ )
t )t≥0 of (5) satisfies the stability conditions
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
fN,iβ (Xt, ψ
i(Xt))dt <∞, lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[vN,iβ (XT )− vN,iβ (x0)] = 0. (27)
Further, the cost to each player i under the equilibrium dynamics (X∗t )t≥0 = (X
φ∗β
t )t≥0 satisfies
inf
ψ∈Ai
JN,i(ψ|x0,φ∗−iβ ) = JN,i(φ∗iβ |x0,φ∗−iβ ) = λN,iβ =
σ2
4(N − 1) +
β
4
.
Proof. We check the candidate Nash equilibrium φ∗β satisfies the integrability condition (6) and
that the corresponding dynamics (X∗t )t≥0 satisfy the stability conditions in (27). First, we review
some facts. Observe Wβ(x) of (21) is uniformly convex: for any vector v ∈ RN and x ∈ WN
v†∇∇Wβ(x)v = 1
2
N∑
k=1
v2i +
β
2(N − 1)
∑
1≤k<`≤N
(v` − vk)2
(x` − xk)2 ≥
1
2
N∑
k=1
v2i .
Notice we may write the global dynamics of the system (24) as a gradient flow
dX∗t = −∇Wβ(X∗t )dt+
σ√
N − 1dWt, X
∗
0 = x0,
with (unique) globally invariant log–concave probability measure given by the β/σ2–ensemble:
µNβ (dx) = m
N
β (x)dx :=
1
ZNβ
· exp
(
−2(N − 1)
σ2
Wβ(x)
)
1WN (x)dx,
=
1
ZNβ
·
∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x` − xk)β/σ2e− (N−1)2σ2
∑N
i=1(x
i)2
1WN (x)dx,
(28)
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where ZNβ <∞ is the normalization constant (compare these expressions with (13), (14), and (16)
of Dyson [32]). Write Ptf(x) := Exf(X∗t ) for the semigroup and the generator as
L := σ
2
2(N − 1)∆x −∇xWβ(x) · ∇x.
Recall that invariance means µNβ (Lf) = 0 for suitable f . More precisely, we say f is in the domain of
L to mean there exists a function g such that for every x ∈ WN , ∫ T
0
|g(X∗t )|dt <∞ and the process
MT := f(X
∗
T )− f(x)−
∫ T
0
g(X∗t )dt is an F–martingale; one then writes Lf = g. The dynamics are
reversible with respect to µNβ and for any f ∈ L1(µNβ ), we have (see, e.g., Rey–Bellet’s notes [58])
1
T
∫ T
0
Ptf(x0)dt
T→∞→ µNβ [f ] =
∫
f(x)µNβ (dx). (29)
Now we check the integrability condition (6) using ideas from the proof of Lemma 4.3.3 of
Anderson–Guionnet–Zeitouni [3]. Since x2−2β log(1+ |x|) is uniformly bounded below and log |x−
y| ≤ log(1 + |x|) + log(1 + |y|) for x, y ∈ R, we can estimate for any 1 ≤ k 6= ` ≤ N
Wβ(x) +
β
4(N − 1) log |x
k − x`| ≥ 1
4
N∑
i=1
[
(xi)2 − 2β log(1 + |xi|)] ≥ −M ′, (30)
for some constant M ′ = M ′(N) ∈ R independent of k, `; indeed, we also have Wβ(x) ≥ −M ′.
Defining TM := inf{t ≥ 0 : Wβ(X∗t ) ≥ M}, the estimate (30) implies that on the event TM > T ,
each gap can be controlled: |Xkt −X`t | ≥ exp
[
−4(N−1)
β
(M +M ′)
]
for all t ≤ T and k 6= `. Hence,
we can use Ito’s formula to compute up until the time TM
dWβ(X
∗
t ) =
(
−
N∑
i=1
(X∗it )
2
4
+
N
4
(
β +
σ2
N − 1
)
+
β
4
(σ2 − β)
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,iX∗t )(X∗it )
N − 1
)
dt+∇Wβ(X∗t )·dWt.
(31)
where the local martingale in (31) stopped at time TM is a true martingale. Putting everything
together and recalling β > σ2, we have
E
N∑
i=1
∫ T∧TM
0
(h2 ∗ µN,iX∗t )(X
∗i
t )dt ≤
4(N − 1)
β(β − σ2) ·
[
N
4
(
β +
σ2
N − 1
)
+M ′
]
E[T ∧ TM ] ≤ Cβ,σ,NT <∞.
(32)
The proof of Lemma 4.3.3 of [3] shows limM→∞ TM = +∞ almost surely, so an application of
Fatou’s lemma implies the expectation of the time integral of the reciprocal gaps squared is finite
for every T > 0. In addition, since µNβ is the global invariant measure, our work also implies that if
X∗ ∼ µNβ , we have E
∑N
i=1(h2 ∗ µN,iX∗ )(X∗i) <∞. (Notice this argument fails for β = σ2 and in fact
these expectations can be shown to diverge by comparison with a 2–dimensional Bessel process.)
Hence, it is now easy to see that the conditions of (6), (27) hold for the candidate Nash equi-
librium φ∗β when β > σ
2 > 0. For example, we now know that vN,iβ is in the domain of L, so by the
fundamental theorem of calculus, the fact that LvN,iβ ∈ L1(µNβ ), ergodicity (29), and then invariance
of µNβ , the second condition of (27) follows from
lim
T→∞
1
T
E[vN,iβ (X
∗
T )− vN,iβ (x0)] = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
Pt(LvN,iβ )(x0)dt = µNβ [LvN,iβ ] = 0.
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Now fix 1 ≤ i ≤ N and ψ ∈ Ai. Using the fact that (vN,iβ (x), λN,iβ ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , solves the
N–Nash system (8) and that Ito’s formula holds for all time as long as no collisions occur, we can
compute (as in Proposition 2.11 of Carmona–Delarue [21])
dvN,iβ (Xt) + [f
N,i
β (Xt, ψ(Xt))− λN,iβ ]dt =
σ√
N − 1
N∑
k=1
∂kv
N,i
β (Xt)dW
k
t
+ [H iβ(Xt,∇xvN,iβ (Xt), (ψ(Xt),φ∗β(Xt)−i))−H iβ(Xt,∇xvN,iβ (Xt),φ∗β(Xt))]dt
(33)
First, the local martingale on the right of (33) is a true martingale by the integrability condition
(6). Second, the Hamiltonian (26) satisfies a strict Isaacs’ condition (see Definition 2.9 of [21]), so
the difference of Hamiltonian values is nonnegative. Third, we can use the two conditions of (27)
to take expectations and limits to conclude
JN,i(ψ|x0,φ∗−i) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
fN,iβ (Xt, ψ(Xt))dt ≥ λN,iβ .
with equality if and only if ψ ≡ φ∗iβ = −∂ivN,iβ . This confirms that the ergodic constant coincides
with the associated minimal cost and concludes the proof.
Remark 4.3. As we note in Remarks 3.5 and 3.9, we have two candidate solutions of the N–
Nash system (8) but the proof of Theorem 4.2 shows at most one of them will furnish an admissible
feedback, namely, the one of φ∗β,φ
∗
κ corresponding to whichever of the two parameters β, κ :=
4
3
σ2−β
is strictly larger than σ2. Thus, we implicitly chose one by fixing β > σ2 at this section’s start.
Now if σ2/3 ≤ β ≤ σ2, when both β, κ ≤ σ2 and −σ4/6 ≤ C ≤ −σ4/8, the integrability condition
(6) fails for both feedbacks φ∗β,φ
∗
κ and we can no longer make sense of them as Nash equilibriums
according to Definition 3.2.
To summarize, for any β ∈ R \ [σ2/3, σ2], the optimal parameter permitting verification is
β∗ := max
{
β,
4
3
σ2 − β
}
, (34)
which corresponds to the set of pairs (vN,iβ∗ , λ
N,i
β∗ ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , with the larger ergodic constant λN,iβ∗ ;
further, the strict lower bound of the coefficient C in (7) for the closed loop model to be well–posed
is “−σ4/8” (a similar lower bound occurs in the Calogero–Sutherland model; see Section 2 of [48]).
Remark 4.4. To recover the case σ = 0, one can formally apply the asymptotic results of Dumitriu–
Edelman [31] and Section 4 of Dette–Imhof [30] to conclude the convergence as σ2 ↓ 0 of the
long–time equilibrium X∗ ∼ µNβ of (28) to the set of zeros x∗ ∈ WN of suitably scaled Hermite
polynomials. If we alternatively start with σ = 0 and fix N ≥ 2, we can similarly replace the state
X∗ with the x∗ ∈ WN that minimizes the convex function Wβ(x) of (21). The values in x∗ are
sometimes referred to as the Fekete points and can be shown to coincide with zeros of orthogonal
polynomials as indicated above. See the introduction of Deift–Kriecherbauer–McLaughlin [28] and
Section 3.4.1 of Tao [67] for nice discussions of these concepts.
Open loop model
To express the cost of the global functional JN from (18), we write (compare with (25) above)
fNβ (x,α) :=
1
2
‖α‖2 + ‖x‖
2
8
+
β
8
(β − 2σ2)
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 . (35)
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Theorem 4.5. Fix β > σ2 > 0 in (35) and recall from Proposition 3.8 the solution pair (Wβ(x), λ
N
β )
to the ergodic HJB equation (20). Fix an interior initial condition x0 ∈ WN . Let (X∗t )t≥0 be given
by β/σ2–Dyson Brownian motion (24). Then the profile (α∗t )t≥0 := (−∇xWβ(X∗t ))t≥0 is a global
minimizer over the class A ⊂ A(N) of strategies (αt)t≥0 such that (Xt)t≥0 = (Xαt )t≥0 of (14) satisfies
the stability conditions
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
fNβ (Xt,αt)dt <∞, lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[Wβ(XT )−Wβ(x0)] = 0. (36)
The global cost under the equilibrium dynamics (X∗t )t≥0 = (X
α∗
t )t≥0 then satisfies
inf
α∈A
JN(α|x0) = JN(α∗|x0) = N · λNβ = N ·
(
σ2
4(N − 1) +
β
8
)
.
Further, for the Dyson game, the strategy (α∗t )t≥0 ∈ A(N) is also an open loop Nash equilibrium over
classes Ai ⊂ Ai(α∗−i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , of deviations (ηt)t≥0 such that the limits in (36) exist, i.e.,
inf
η∈Ai
JN,i(η|x0,α∗−i) = JN,i(α∗i|x0,α∗−i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Finally, when β = σ2 in the cost (35) of JN , the global minimization problem admits a minimizing
sequence with value N · λNσ2.
Proof. The proof follows essentially verbatim that of the closed loop Verification Theorem (4.2),
except for the last two statements. The first one follows because we have identified in Proposition
3.7 that the potential game structure holds over stable deviations where the limit of the time average
cost (16) exists. To sketch the last claim, for β > σ2, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and with X ∼ µNβ of (28), we have
E[fNβ (X,−∇xWβ(X))]− E[fNσ2(X,−∇xWβ(X))] =
[
β
8
(β − 2σ2)−
(
−σ
4
8
)] N∑
i=1
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
(N − 1)
=
[
β
4
− (β + σ
2)
8
]
(β − σ2)
N∑
i=1
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
(N − 1)
β↓σ2→ 0,
(37)
where we rely on (32) to know that the factor right of the square brackets is bounded as β ↓ σ2.
Remark 4.6. A similar discussion as in Remark 4.3 applies for Theorem 4.5, but note that we may
take any β ≥ σ2 in the auxiliary global problem; indeed, compared to (34), the analogous open loop
optimal parameter that permits verification is now β∗ := max{β, 2σ2 − β} for any β ∈ R.
4.1 Comparison of closed and open loop models
Keeping σ > 0 fixed, we know by Theorems 4.2, 4.5 that the Nash–optimal repulsion parameters
are given by the larger roots in the variable “β” of the quadratic relationships C = β
2
(
3
4
β − σ2)
from Proposition 3.4 for C > −σ4/8 and C = β
4
(β − 2σ2) from Proposition 3.8 for C ≥ −σ4/4:
βclosed(C) :=
2
3
(
σ2 +
√
σ4 + 6C
)
, βopen(C) := σ
2 +
√
σ4 + 4C; (38)
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Figure 1: The top left plot compares the Nash–optimal βclosed(C), βopen(C) and global average
minimizing βopen(2C) parameters. The bottom left compares the average cost λ¯
N
open(C) under the
open loop Nash equilibrium with the optimal global average cost λNβopen(2C), which only coincide at
C = 0; in particular, except at this coincidence, the Nash equilibriums are never global average
minimizers. Fixing C = 0, the top right compares the (approximate) optimal costs by location for
individual players of each model. The bottom right compares the equilibrium player densities.
(see top left plot of Figure 1). For the open loop model, we can approximate individual player costs
using the mean field equation (42) below (see top right plot of Figure 1). We can also approximate
the average cost under the open loop equilibrium, which we denote by λ¯Nopen(C); namely, averaging
(16) over 1 ≤ i ≤ N and using the limit calculation (76) of Remark 7.4, we have for N large
λ¯Nopen(C) := λ
N
βopen(C) +
C
2
· 1
N
N∑
i=1
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 ≈
βopen(C)
8
+
C
4(βopen(C)− σ2) ,
where X ∼ µNβopen(C) (recall definition (28) of µNβ ).
Notice the open loop strategy prescribes a higher repulsion to accommodate the players densely
packed around the origin, i.e., βopen(C) > βclosed(C), and in doing so achieves a lower average cost,
i.e., λ¯Nopen(C) <
1
N
∑N
i=1 λ
N,i
βclosed(C)
≈ βclosed(C)
4
. However, the closed loop Nash equilibrium is fair to
all (no matter their rank) while the open loop Nash equilibrium has greater cost for players away
from the origin. Lastly, recall λNβopen(C) is an auxiliary cost; indeed, βopen(2C) minimizes the actual
global average cost with minimum λNβopen(2C), for given C > −σ4/8 (see red curves in Figure 1).
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For either model of player information, we may write the equilibrium profile in feedback form
using the function
φ∗β(x) = −∇xWβ(x) = (−∂ivN,iβ (x))Ni=1 =
(
β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)−
xi
2
)N
i=1
.
Our discussion above implies a surprising consequence: we never have equality of the equilibrium
strategies φ∗βclosed(C)(x), φ
∗
βopen(C)(x), even after taking N → ∞ (unless C = 0 and we remove the
state–constraint and reciprocal gap integrability conditions in our Definition 3.1 of admissibility).
Indeed, the closed and open loop Nash equilibriums always yield different mean field behavior. Even
though this discrepancy only appears in the radius of the limiting semicircle law µβ (see the bottom
right plot of Figure 1), the repulsion parameter β/σ2 distinguishes universality class in the local
limit behavior. We believe this result offers a new perspective on Problem 9 of Deift’s list [29],
which asks to construct a model to explain Sˇeba’s findings [61] that gaps between parked cars can
exhibit GUE statistics (β = 2σ2) on a two–way street but GOE statistics (β = σ2) on a one–way
street. Although we do not construct a specific model for this observational study, we have shown
rigorously that universality class can vary depending only on player information and not just on
the cost they face. For example, if C = 0, σ = 1, then βclosed(0) =
4
3
and βopen(0) = 2 (see the right
two plots in Figure 1; note the latter corresponds to GUE (1)).
5 Mean field equations
Observe we may write the solution (9) to the N–Nash system (8) in the form vN,iβ (x) = Uβ(x
i, µN,ix ),
where
Uβ(x, µ) :=
x2
4
− β
2
(h0 ∗ µ)(x), (x, µ) ∈ R× Pp2 (R), 1 < p <∞, (39)
(see the estimate (67) below to explain the choice of domain). Contrastingly, the state cost FN,i(x)
of (7) cannot naively be written as a function with a probability measure argument because the
singular cost term “(h2 ∗ µ)(x)” is not well defined for x ∈ supp(µ). Instead, we expect this
ill–behaved transform to be replaced by a local term proportional to the squared density “m(x)2”.
More precisely, to guess the mean field analog of the N–Nash system (8) associated to the closed
loop model, we introduce the Voiculescu–Wigner master equation on R× Pp2 (R), 2 ≤ p <∞:∫
R
∂µU(x, µ)(z)∂xU(z, µ)µ(dz) +
1
2
|∂xU(x, µ)|2 = x
2
8
+
pi2β2
8
m(x)2 − λ, (40)
(compare with equation (71) of Cardaliaguet–Porretta [20]). Here, the Wasserstein gradient “∂µ”
can be formally interpreted as
∂µU(x, µ)(z) = ∂z
δU¯
δm
(x,m)(z), (41)
for µ almost every z ∈ R, where we write “U¯(x,m)” for the mapping on R × Lp(R) induced by
U(x, µ) and “ δ
δm
” is the Fre´chet derivative on the linear space Lp(R).
Similarly, to serve as the mean field analog of the ergodic HJB equation (20) for the global mini-
mization problem associated to the open loop model, we introduce the following ergodic Hamilton–
Jacobi equation on the Wasserstein space P32 (R):
1
2
∫
R
|∂µU(µ)(x)|2µ(dx) =
∫
R
(
x2
8
+
pi2β2
24
m(x)2
)
µ(dx)− λ, (42)
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(compare with (1.4) in Gangbo–S´wie¸ch [36]). Given the form of the function Wβ(x) of (21), we are
motivated to consider the functional
Uβ(µ) := 1
4
(∫
R
x2µ(dx)− β
∫
R
∫
R
log |x− y|µ(dy)µ(dx)
)
, µ ∈ Pp2 (R), 1 < p <∞. (43)
Lemma 5.1. The formal calculations
∂µUβ(µ)(x) = ∂xUβ(x, µ) = x
2
− β
2
Hµ(x), ∂µUβ(x, µ)(z) =
β
2
1
x− z , (44)
obtained from the computational expression (41) can be understood rigorously as follows:
For every µ ∈ P32 (R), the subdifferential of minimum norm is the unique element ∂µUβ(µ)(x) ∈
L2(µ) satisfying, for every φ ∈ C∞0 (R),∫
R
∂µUβ(µ)(z)φ(z)µ(dz) =
∫
R
z
2
φ(z)µ(dz)− β
4
∫
R
∫
R
φ(z)− φ(y)
z − y µ(dz)µ(dy). (45)
For every µ ∈ Pp2 (R), 2 ≤ p <∞, with density m(x) and for every φ(x) ∈ L2(µ), we define∫
R
∂µUβ(x, µ)(z)φ(z)µ(dz) := lim
δ↓0
Uβ(x, (Tδ)#µ)− Uβ(x, µ)
δ
=
β
2
H[φ ·m](x), (46)
where Tδ(z) := z + δφ(z).
Proof. Either Lemma 3.7 of Carrillo–Ferreira–Precioso [23] or Lemma 5.3 of Berman–O¨nnheim [12]
establishes the existence of a minimal selection ∂µUβ(µ)(x) ∈ L2(µ) for every µ ∈ P32 (R), and the
weak expression (45) appears as (3.12) of the first source or as (5.3) of the second.
Turning to Uβ(x, µ), the action in (46) makes sense since φ(x)m(x) ∈ L
2p
p+1 (R):∫
R
(φ(x)2m(x))
p
p+1 ·m(x) pp+1dx ≤
(∫
R
φ(x)2m(x)dx
)p/(p+1)(∫
R
m(x)pdx
)1/(p+1)
<∞, (47)
by Ho¨lder’s inequality. Then we can compute the metric derivative directly:
lim
δ↓0
Uβ(x, (Tδ)#µ)− Uβ(x, µ)
δ
= lim
δ↓0
−β
2
∫
R
[
log(|z + δφ(z)− x| − log(|z − x|)]µ(dz)
δ
=
β
2
H[φ ·m](x),
(48)
where the last equality follows by the monotone convergence theorem (see also the proof of Lemma
2.45 of Deift–Kriecherbauer–McLaughlin [28]).
Theorem 5.2. Fix β ∈ R. For every µ ∈ Pp2 (R), 2 ≤ p < ∞, the pair (Uβ(x, µ), β4 ) forms a
solution of the Voiculescu–Wigner master equation (40). For every µ ∈ P32 (R), the pair (Uβ(µ), β8 )
forms a solution to the ergodic Hamilton–Jacobi equation (42).
Remark 5.3. As Cardaliaguet points out on pg. 3 of [18], the local dependence on the righthandside
of the master equation (40) makes it difficult to define a general notion of solution. For our purposes,
it is enough that we can make sense of each term and establish equality.
Proof. For the first statement, note by item (2) of Theorem 2.2 in Carton–Lebrun [24] that for any
m ∈ Lp(R) with 2 ≤ p <∞, we have the Hilbert transform product rule
pi2m2(x) = (Hm)2(x)− 2H[mHm](x), (49)
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for almost every x ∈ R. Moreover, since µ ∈ Pp2 (R), we have xm(x) ∈ L
2p
p+1 (R) by (47). Since
2p
p+1
≥ 4
3
, the two expressions of (44) from Lemma 5.1 can now be combined rigorously to compute∫
∂µUβ(x, µ)(z)∂xUβ(z, µ)µ(dz) =
β
4
H[zm(z)](x)− β
2
4
H[mHm](x), (50)
Next, we have
1
2
(
x
2
− β
2
Hµ(x)
)2
=
x2
8
+
β2
8
(Hµ)2(x)− β
4
xHµ(x),
and these last two equations lead us to compute for almost every x ∈ R
β
4
(H[zm(z)](x)− xHm(x)) = −β
4
.
The statement then follows by combining terms and using the product rule (49).
For the second claim, Lemma 6.5.4 of Blower [15] or Lemma 3.3 of Voiculescu [70] establishes
the identity ∫
R
(Hµ)2(x)µ(dx) =
pi2
3
∫
R
m3(x)dx (51)
for µ ∈ P3(R). Further, for µ ∈ P32 (R) we can integrate the identity
x(Hµ)(x) = 1− p.v.
∫
R
y
y − xµ(dy)
against µ to compute
∫
R x(Hµ)(x)µ(dx) =
1
2
. The proof then follows by direct computation.
Remark 5.4. The notion of free information, defined on L3(R) by
∫
m3(x)dx, was introduced
by Voiculescu in [70] and the identity (51) indicates the role of “Hµ(x)” as score function. The
Hamilton–Jacobi equation (42) essentially appears as the heuristic limit (1.4.4) of Biane–Speicher
[13]; indeed, when λ = β
8
, the righthandside of (42) can be written as the relative free Fisher
information, defined on P32 (R) by (cf. Section 6.1 of [13])
1
2
∫ (
β
2
Hµ(x)− x
2
)2
µ(dx). (52)
Further, taking the Fre´chet derivative of (52) formally yields the righthandside of (40) with λ = β
4
.
Therefore, finding a measure µ¯ such that Uβ(x, µ¯) is constant corresponds to a first order condition
on the relative free Fisher information (52), which is consistent with Voiculescu’s information–
minimizing characterization of Wigner’s semicircle law, Proposition 5.2 of [70]. These considerations
motivate why we refer to (40) as the Voiculescu–Wigner master equation (although Lions [52] is
responsible for the lefthandside). The idea that RMT-type statistics occur when some metric of
information is minimized appears repeatedly in the literature; see Chapter 3.6 of Mehta [54] for the
origins of this idea for a fixed “symmetry class,” but the attempt to identify a critical point of the
repulsion parameter β/σ2 using mutual information seems to be more recent, e.g., [71, 72].
Characterizations of the semicircle law
We close this section with a quick review of how the semicircle law arises from the mean field objects
just discussed above. Fix β > 0. A standard characterization of the semicircle law µβ with density
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mβ defined in (4) is as the unique solution of the integral variational system
Uβ(x, µβ)
{
= cβ, x ∈ supp(µβ)
≥ cβ, otherwise
(53)
for some constant cβ (see Lemma 2.6.2 of [3], Theorem 4.4.1 of [15], Proposition 2.3 of [23], Problem
1 of [28], or Section 2 of [43] for various perspectives). In particular, Uβ(x, µβ) is a constant for x
in the support of µβ. Similarly, Theorem 3 of the classic work [11] of Ben Arous–Guionnet confirms
that the potential function Uβ(µ) of 43 achieves its minimum at µβ.
Following Remark 5.4, take any measure µ¯ with density m¯ such that Uβ(x, µ¯) is constant for
x ∈ supp(µ¯). Then the Voiculescu–Wigner master equation (40) reads
0 =
x2
8
+
pi2β2
8
m¯(x)2 − β
4
, (54)
which implies m¯(x) = mβ(x) necessarily (note supp(µ¯) = supp(µβ) follows because µ¯ ∈ P(R)).
Now the local, first order, ergodic MFG system associated to the master equation (40) has the form{
1
2
|∂xv(x)|2 + λ = x28 + pi
2β2
8
m(x)2
−∂x(m(x)∂xv(x)) = 0
, (55)
and it follows from (53), (54) that this system is solved by the triple (Uβ(x, µβ), λβ,mβ(x)) with
λβ :=
β
4
. If there is another solution (v∗(x), λ∗,m∗(x)) with larger ergodic constant λ∗ > λβ, then
x2
8
+
pi2β2
8
mβ(x)
2 =
1
2
|∂xUβ(x, µβ)|2 + λβ = λβ < 1
2
|∂xv∗(x)|2 + λ∗ = x
2
8
+
pi2β2
8
m∗(x)2.
But this last equation implies mβ(x) < m
∗(x) for x in the support of mβ, which is impossible since
both are probability measures. Hence, λβ is the largest ergodic constant for which the system (55)
admits a solution. In the next section, Theorem 6.4 verifies that the ergodic constant λβ coincides
with the infimum of the costs of the associated mean field control problem.
6 Mean field game formulation
Fix a curve (µt)t≥0 ∈ C([0,∞),P32 (R)) of probability measures.
Definition 6.1. A feedback functional φ : R × P(R) → R is admissible for (µt)t≥0 if for any F0–
measurable initial condition ξ with law in P32 (R), there is a unique solution (Xt)t≥0 = (Xφt )t≥0 to
the R–valued dynamics
dXt = φ(Xt, µt)dt, X0 = ξ, (56)
such that (Xt)t≥0 has laws (νt)t≥0 in C([0,∞),P32 (R)) and satisfies the integrability condition
E
∫ T
0
φ(Xt, µt)
2dt <∞, for all T > 0. (57)
We denote the class of such feedbacks by A(µ·).
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For any F0–measurable initial condition ξ with law in P32 (R), consider the optimization problem
of minimizing the ergodic cost
J(ψ|ξ, µ·) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
[
1
2
ψ(Xt, µt)
2 +
X2t
8
+
pi2β2
8
·mt(Xt)2
]
dt (58)
over ψ ∈ A(µ·), subject to (Xt)t≥0 = (Xψt )t≥0 satisfying (56) with X0 = ξ.
Remark 6.2. The notion of admissibility Definition 6.1 ensures the expression (58) is finite for
every T > 0 (by Ho¨lder’s inequality), which partially explains the choice of space P32 (R). Relatedly,
this space is a natural domain for the relative free Fisher information (52) of Remark 5.4.
Definition 6.3. Let (µt)t≥0 ∈ C([0,∞),P32 (R)) have densities (mt(x))t≥0 and let φ ∈ A(µ·). Then
the pair (φ(x, µ), (µt)t≥0) is an ergodic MFG solution over the class A ⊂ A(µ·) if the process
(Xt)t≥0 = (X
φ
t )t≥0 of (56) satisfies the fixed point condition Xt ∼ µt, t ≥ 0, and the optimality
condition
inf
ψ∈A
J(ψ|X0, µ·) = J(φ|X0, µ·). (59)
Recall β/σ2–Dyson Brownian motion (X∗t )t≥0 of 24. Theorem 1 of Rogers–Shi [59] (see also
Section 4.3.2 of [3]) provides natural conditions under which, for any T > 0, (µNXt)0≤t≤T converges
a.s. on C([0, T ];P(R)) as N →∞ to the unique solution (µ∗t )0≤t≤T of the McKean–Vlasov equation∫
R
f(x)µT (dx) =
∫
R
f(x)µ0(dx) +
1
2
∫ T
0
(
β
2
∫
R
∫
R
f ′(x)− f ′(y)
x− y µt(dx)µt(dy)−
∫
R
xf ′(x)µt(dx)
)
dt
(60)
for any twice continuously differentiable test function f with f, xf ′(x), f ′′(x) bounded. The flow
(µ∗t )t≥0 is thus the natural candidate for an MFG solution in the sense of Definition 6.3. Before
stating the next theorem that verifies this candidate, we define for (x, µ, y, α) ∈ R×P32 (R)×R×R
the running cost
f(x, µ, α) :=
α2
2
+
x2
8
+
pi2β2
8
m(x)2 (61)
and the Hamiltonian
H(x, µ, y, α) := y · α + f(x, µ, α). (62)
Recall the definitions (39), (43) of Uβ(x, µ), Uβ(µ), respectively.
Theorem 6.4. Fix β > 0. Assume (µ∗t )t≥0 satisfies (60) with µ
∗
0 ∈ P32 (R). Consider the (nonlocal)
feedback
φ∗β(x, µ) := −∂µUβ(µ)(x) = −∂xUβ(x, µ) =
β
2
Hµ(x)− x
2
. (63)
Then the pair (φ∗β(x, µ), (µ
∗
t )t≥0) forms an ergodic MFG solution over the class A ⊂ A(µ∗· ) of
deviations ψ(x, µ) such that (Xt)t≥0 = (X
ψ
t )t≥0 of (56) with X0 ∼ µ∗0 satisfies the stability conditions
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
f(Xt, µ
∗
t , ψ(Xt, µ
∗
t ))dt <∞, lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[Uβ(XT , µ∗T )− Uβ(X0, µ∗0)] = 0. (64)
Further, the cost achieved by the optimal trajectories (X∗t )t≥0 = (X
φ∗
t )t≥0 satisfies
inf
ψ∈A
J(ψ|X∗0 , µ∗· ) = J(φ∗β|X∗0 , µ∗· ) = λβ =
β
4
.
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Proof. Note the curve (µ∗t )t≥0 is in C([0,∞),P32 (R)) by known regularity results: first, µ∗t remains
in P2(R) for all t > 0 being a gradient flow of the “free energy” functional Uβ(µ) by Theorem
3.2.(1) of Carrillo–Ferreira–Precioso [23] 1; second, µ∗t remains in P3(R) for all t > 0 by Corollary
5.3 of Biane–Speicher [13] or Remark 7.7 of Biler–Karch–Monneau [14] after rescaling variables
as in Section 2.1 of [23] (see also Proposition 4.7 of Voiculescu [70]). Now Theorem 3.8 of [23]
implies the densities (m∗t (x))t≥0 of (µ
∗
t )t≥0 satisfy the following nonlinear transport equation (in the
distributional sense; cf. (8.1.3) of [2]):
∂tm
∗
t (x) + ∂x
(
m∗t (x)φ
∗
β(x, µ
∗
t )
)
= 0. (65)
Then to obtain the probabilistic representation (X∗t )t≥0 = (X
φ∗β
t )t≥0 as in (56), we have by the free
energy identity (see Theorem 11.2.1 of [2], Proposition 6.1 of [13], or Theorem 3.2.(4) of [23])∫ T
0
∫
R
|φ∗β(x, µ∗t )|2µ∗t (dx)dt = Uβ(µ∗0)− Uβ(µ∗T ) <∞.
Besides confirming (57), this checks the rather weak sufficient condition of Theorem 8.2.1 from
Ambrosio–Gigli–Savare´ [2], which furnishes a probability measure on path space C([0, T ],R) for all
T > 0 such that the associated process satisfies X∗t ∼ µ∗t for each t ≥ 0 (see equation (8.2.8) of [2]).
Hence, we have checked the Definition 6.1 of admissibility for (63), i.e., φ∗β(x, µ) ∈ A(µ∗· ).
Now it suffices to check the optimality condition (59) and the conditions (64) for (X∗t )t≥0. Toward
this end, consider an admissible ψ(x, µ) ∈ A and let (Xt)t≥0 = (Xψt )t≥0 solve (56) with X0 ∼ µ∗0.
Then by Lemma 5.1 and the chain rule of Lemma 6.5 below, we have (compare with (33))
E [Uβ(XT , µ∗T )− Uβ(X0, µ∗0)]
= E
∫ T
0
(
∂xUβ(Xt, µ
∗
t ) · ψ(Xt, µ∗t ) +
∫
R
∂µUβ(Xt, µ
∗
t )(z)φ
∗
β(z, µ
∗
t )m
∗
t (z)dz
)
dt
= E
∫ T
0
[λβ − f(Xt, µ∗t , ψ(Xt, µ∗t ))] dt
+ E
∫ T
0
[H(Xt, µ
∗
t , ∂xUβ(Xt, µ
∗
t ), ψ(Xt, µ
∗
t ))−H(Xt, µ∗t , ∂xUβ(Xt, µ∗t ),−∂xUβ(Xt, µ∗t ))] dt,
(66)
where the second equality uses that Uβ(x, µ) solves the master equation (40) for µ ∈ P32 (R) by
Theorem 5.2. Since the difference of the Hamiltonian values in (66) is nonnegative, we have for
ψ ∈ A
J(ψ|X0, µ∗· ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
∫ T
0
f(Xt, µ
∗
t , ψ(Xt, µ
∗
t ))dt ≥ λβ =
β
4
.
To establish equality here under the feedback φ∗β(x, µ) of (63), note for this choice the difference
of the Hamiltonians in (66) vanishes, so we just need to establish the second condition in (64).
But from Theorem 3.2.(3) of [23], we have the second moment convergence as T →∞ of µ∗T to the
semicircle law µβ defined by (4) (recall it is the minimum of Uβ by Theorem 3 of Ben Arous–Guionnet
[11]) as well as the relative entropy type estimate
0 ≤ Uβ(µ∗T )− Uβ(µβ) ≤ e−c(T−s)[Uβ(µ∗s)− Uβ(µβ)]
1As pointed out in Remark 5.9 of Berman–O¨nnheim [12], there is apparently an error here regarding the domain
of Uβ , but the positive initial density in L3(R) ensures sufficient regularity of the flow (µ∗t )t≥0 for our purposes.
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for every 0 ≤ s ≤ T and some constant c > 0. Hence, we readily have
1
T
EUβ(X∗T , µ∗T ) =
1
T
[
2 · Uβ(µ∗T )−
1
4
∫
R
x2µ∗T (dx)
]
T→∞→ 0,
as required. This completes the proof after checking the application of the chain rule for (66).
Since by Lemma 5.1 we interpret “∂µUβ(x, µ)(z)” through the metric derivative (46) rather than
as a subdifferential of minimum norm (the latter characterization does not seem straightforward to
realize), we prove the following chain rule to complement Lemma 5.1 and justify (66) above.
Lemma 6.5. Assume the same setting as for Theorem 6.4. Let ψ(x, µ) ∈ A(µ∗· ) so that the laws
(νt)t≥0 ∈ C([0,∞),P32 (R)) of (Xψt )t≥0 of (56) have densities nt(x) satisfying (in the distributional
sense) the transport equation
∂tnt(x) + ∂x (nt(x)ψ(x, µ
∗
t )) = 0.
Then we have for any T ≥ 0 the following chain rule:∫
R
Uβ(x, µ
∗
T )νT (dx)−
∫
R
Uβ(x, µ
∗
0)ν0(dx) =∫ T
0
∫
R
(
∂xUβ(x, µ
∗
t )ψ(x, µ
∗
t ) +
∫
R
∂µUβ(x, µ
∗
t )(z)φ
∗
β(z, µ
∗
t )µt(dz)
)
νt(dx)dt.
Proof. For any ν ∈ Pp2 (R), 1 < p <∞, with density n(x), we have by Minkowski’s inequality∣∣∣∣∫
R
log(|z − x|)ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣ ≤∫|z−x|≤1 | log(|z − x|)ν(dx) +
∫
|z−x|>1
| log(|z − x|)|ν(dx)
≤2
(∫ 1
0
| log(x)| pp−1dx
) p−1
p ‖n‖Lp(R) +
∫
R
|z − x|ν(dx)
≤Cp
(
‖n‖Lp(R) + z2 +
∫
R
x2ν(dx)
)
.
(67)
for some constant Cp > 0. Hence, the mapping µ 7→
∫
R Uβ(x, µ)ν(dx) is continuous on P2(R) with
respect to the 2–Wasserstein distance. Now fix t ≥ 0 and let p = 3. Define Tδ(x) := x+ δψ(x, µ∗t ),
δ > 0. We know by Proposition 8.4.6 of [2] that d2(µ
∗
t+δ, (Tδ)#µ
∗
t ) = o(δ), and by Lemma 5.1 and
the continuity of µ 7→ ∫R Uβ(x, µ)ν(dx), we have for almost every t ≥ 0∫
R
Uβ(x, µ
∗
t+δ)ν(dx)−
∫
R
Uβ(x, µ
∗
t )ν(dx) =
∫
R
[Uβ(x, (Tδ)#µ
∗
t )− Uβ(x, µ∗t )] ν(dx)
+
∫
R
Uβ(x, µ
∗
t+δ)ν(dx)−
∫
R
Uβ(x, (Tδ)#µ
∗
t )ν(dx)
= δ
∫
R
∫
R
∂µUβ(x, µ
∗
t )(z)φ
∗
β(z, µ
∗
t )µ
∗
t (dz)ν(dx) + o(δ).
By (47) and (50), the integrand x 7→ ∫R ∂µUβ(x, µ∗t )(z)∂xUβ(z, µ∗t )µ∗t (dz) is in L3/2(R), and so its
integral with respect to ν ∈ P32 (R) is finite by Ho¨lder’s inequality. The statement then follows from
the product rule and the distributional equation for (νt)t≥0.
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Remark 6.6. To recover the ranked player perspective in the mean field setting, we can use
equations (60), (65) satisfied by (µ∗t )t≥0 to formally compute the corresponding flow of distribution
functions (F ∗t (x))t≥0 as
∂tF
∗
t (x) = m
∗
t (x) ·
(
x
2
− β
2
Hm∗t (x)
)
.
From here, we may compute the dynamics for the quantiles γqt := inf{x ∈ R : F ∗t (x) ≥ q}, q ∈ [0, 1]:
dγqt =
−∂tF ∗t (γqt )
m∗t (γ
p
t )
dt =
(
β
2
Hm∗t (γ
q
t )−
γqt
2
)
dt = −∂xUβ(γqt , µ∗t )dt. (68)
To make these manipulations rigorous, one can probably use the same line of argument as for
Proposition 4 of Crisan–Kurtz–Lee [27]. Note (68) is exactly the expected limiting dynamics of a
sequence X∗it of player(s) i = i(N) with limN→∞ i/N = q ∈ [0, 1], which motivates the discussion
on convergence of optimal trajectories in Remark 7.9.
7 Localized convergence of equations
If the reader compares the ergodic N–Nash system (8) with the Voiculescu–Wigner master equation
(40), they might be puzzled how to go from one to the other; in particular, it is unclear what should
account for the change in the form of the cost (not only the nonlocal–to–local transition, but also
the coefficients). To the point, Proposition 3.4 shows the diffusion parameter σ2 is linked to the
state cost FN,i(x) of (7) through its relationship to the singular cost coefficient, C = β
2
(3
4
β−σ2), but
only the coupling parameter β appears (explicitly) in the master equation (40). The astute reader
might ask whether we forgot a term in the master equation (40) to account for this discrepancy. It
turns out that, despite vanishing, the diffusion term does contribute in the limit but its contribution
cancels with the local contributions from the drift–interaction terms (Theorem 7.5), leaving only a
local contribution from the control cost that accounts for the apparent discrepancy above.
To establish convergence of equations, we generalize in two ways the program outlined in Remark
(x) after Theorem 2.3 of Lasry–Lions [50]: first we work with a natural class of player ensembles that
are locally optimal for the Dyson game, and second we consider localized convergence. By “locally
optimal,” we mean we can recover the master equation (40) by integrating the N–Nash system
(8) against ensembles of the Nash–optimal universality class; by “localized,” we mean instead of
working with an exchangeable system, we classify the ranked players by their mean field location.
More precisely, fix β > σ2 > 0 and let V (x) be twice continuously differentiable with V ′′(x) ≥ cV
for all x ∈ R and some constant cV > 0. Denote by X ∈ WN the ranked players in a possible long
time equilibrium distributed according to a generalized β/σ2–ensemble:
µNV (dx) = m
N
V (x)dx =
1
ZNV
·
∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x` − xk)β/σ2 · e−N−1σ2
∑N
i=1 V (x
i)
1WN (x)dx, (69)
where ZNV <∞ is a normalization constant. In particular, we consider player ensembles µNV of the
same universality class as the Nash–optimal Gaussian ensemble µNβ of (28), whose local behavior is
dominated by the repulsion strength “β/σ2.” Note µNV is the invariant distribution of the gradient
flow
dX it =
[
β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,iXt )(X it)−
V ′(X it)
2
]
dt+
σ√
N − 1dW
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (70)
Indeed, the dynamics (70) are nonexplosive by Corollary 6.9 of Graczyk–Ma lecki [38], and a calcu-
lation similar to (31) and (32) confirms admissibility of (70) for the Dyson game when β > σ2.
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By Theorems 4.4.1, 4.4.3.(i), and 5.4.3 of Blower [15], there exists a unique measure µV ∈
P2(R), compactly supported on a single interval with density mV (x) ∈ L2(R), that satisfies the
1–Wasserstein convergence d1(µ
N
X, µV )
N→∞→ 0 almost surely for X ∼ µNV and that satisfies the
characterizing Euler–Lagrange (or Schwinger–Dyson) equation:
β
2
HµV (x)− V
′(x)
2
= 0, for all x ∈ supp(µV ). (71)
Write γq = γqV := inf{x ∈ R : µV ((−∞, x]) ≥ q} for q ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 7.1. Assume β > σ2 > 0. Consider a sequence i = i(N) of player(s) such that
limN→∞ i/N = q ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have
lim
N→∞
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 = limN→∞
1
(N − 1)2E
∑
k:k 6=i
1
(X i −Xk)2 =
pi2β
3(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2. (72)
Remark 7.2. Proposition 7.1 is an extension of the guess in Remark 3.9 of Gorin–Shkolnikov [37]
to the case of a uniformly convex potential V (x) and to any convergent sequence of indices, i.e.,
both at the edge (q = 0, 1) and in the bulk (q ∈ (0, 1)). Indeed, our result implies their guess upon
taking V (x) = x2/2, σ = 1, q = 1, limN→∞XN = γ1 =
√
2β; for convenience in referencing Section
3 of that paper, the relationship of our ensemble X to their notation “X” is
√
N−1
N
√
2
β
X
d
= X/N.
Proof. First, as N → ∞ we have E(X i − γq)2 → 0. To see this, we know by Corollary 6.3.5 of
Blower [15] that µNV satisfies a logarithmic Sobolev inequality with constant (N − 1)/σ2 and thus
by Proposition 6.7.3 of the same reference satisfies a Poincare´ inequality with the same constant,
implying Var(X i)→ 0 as N →∞. The fact that EX i → γq as N →∞ follows from the results of
Section 2.6 of [3], which yields the desired L2 convergence.
Now for fixed N , we can compute
∑
k:k 6=i
1
xi − xk ·
∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x` − xk)β/σ2 = σ
2
β
∂i
[ ∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x` − xk)β/σ2
]
and(∑
k:k 6=i
1
xi − xk
)2
− σ
2
β
∑
k:k 6=i
1
(xi − xk)2
· ∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x`−xk)β/σ2 =
(
σ2
β
)2
∂2i
[ ∏
1≤k<`≤N
(x` − xk)β/σ2
]
.
Hence, we have by integration by parts (see the proof of Lemma 4.3.17 of [3] and Section 3 of [37])
E
[
V ′(X i) · (h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
]
=
EV ′(X i)2
β
− σ
2EV ′′(X i)
β(N − 1)
N→∞→ V
′(γq)2
β
(73)
and similarly
E
[
[(h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)]2 −
σ2
β
(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1
]
N→∞→ V
′(γq)2
β2
(74)
Now let LV be the generator of (70) and take f(x) := V (xi)2 − β2 (h0 ∗ µN,ix )(xi), x ∈ WN , in the
invariance identity µNV [LV f ] = 0 (this application of integration by parts along with Proposition
23
3.4 recovers the calculation of the optimal cost in Theorem 4.2 for the Gaussian case). Calculating
as in the proof of Proposition 3.4 and letting N →∞ in this invariance identity, we have
β
4
∫
R
V ′(γq)− V ′(z)
γq − z mV (z)dz = limN→∞
β2
8
E
[
[(h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)]2 −
σ2
β
(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1
]
+ lim
N→∞
E
[
V ′(X i)2
4
− β
4
V ′(X i) · (h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i) +
3β
8
(β − σ2)(h2 ∗ µ
N,i
X )(X
i)
N − 1
]
=
β2
8
· V
′(γq)2
β2
+
V ′(γq)2
4
− β
4
· V
′(γq)2
β
+
3β
8
(β − σ2) lim
N→∞
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 .
Rearranging this last expression, we arrive at
lim
N→∞
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 =
1
3β(β − σ2) ·
[
2β
∫
R
V ′(γq)− V ′(z)
γq − z mV (z)dz − V
′(γq)2
]
. (75)
Since mV (x) ∈ L2(R), we may apply the Hilbert transform product rule (49) by item (2) of Theorem
2.2 in Carton–Lebrun [24] together with some applications of Euler–Lagrange (71) to get
pi2β2mV (x)
2 = β2(HmV )
2(x)− 2β2H[mVHmV ](x) = [2βV ′(x)HmV (x)− V ′(x)2]− 2βH[mV V ′](x).
This is exactly the term in square brackets of (75) when x = γq, which completes the proof.
Remark 7.3. For some choices of parameters, one can compute expressions like (72) directly. To
sketch this for the archetype choice V (x) = x2/2, β = 2, σ = 1 corresponding to the GUE ensemble
(1), we can use the asymptotic formula for the sine kernel (see, e.g., Section 3.5 of [3]) to get
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 ≈ m2(γ
q)2 ·
∫
R
1
y2
(
1−
(
sin(piy)
piy
)2)
dy = 2
pi2
3
m2(γ
q)2.
Thus, an interesting aspect of the proof of Proposition 7.1 is that we did not need to rely on such
detailed local limit behavior in the bulk, q ∈ (0, 1); it turns out that the content of the Verification
Theorem 4.2 is the right structure to combine with the integration by parts trick (73),(74).
Remark 7.4. One can sometimes symmetrize a ranked particle system to ensure exchangeability
and tightness while preserving the empirical distribution; see Sections I.3.(e) and II.5 of Sznitman
[66]. Correspondingly, if we average the optimal cost calculation of the Verification Theorem 4.2
over all indices, we can make use of the identities (22), (23) to conclude the integrated version of
the convergence (72):
lim
N→∞
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
E(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1 =
1
2(β − σ2) =
pi2β
3(β − σ2)E[mβ(X¯)
2], (76)
where X ∼ µNβ and X¯ ∼ µβ. Recall in Section 4.1 the calculation (76) aided in producing Figure 1.
Observe the control term has vanishing expectation in optimal equilibrium, i.e., µNβ
[
∂iv
N,i
β
]
= 0,
and by Euler–Lagrange (71), the analogous mean field identity holds exactly for the semicircle law
µβ, i.e., ∂xUβ(x, µβ) = 0 for x ∈ supp(µβ). Nevertheless, the next theorem shows that as N → ∞
the control cost term “µNβ
[
1
2
(∂iv
N,i
β )
2
]
” still contributes a local term in the bulk, i.e., at a location
γq with q ∈ (0, 1). The calculation of this contribution helps us establish one of the main results of
this paper: the localized convergence of equations, from the N–Nash system (8) to the Voiculescu–
Wigner master equation (40), against locally optimal player ensembles.
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Theorem 7.5. Fix β > σ2 > 0 and let V : R → R be twice continuously differentiable satisfying
V ′′(x) ≥ cV > 0 for all x ∈ R for some constant cV . Recall the definitions (69) of µNV and (71) of µV .
Note µNV is an admissible player ensemble for the closed loop Dyson game. Then for any sequence
i = i(N) of indices with limN→∞ i/N = q ∈ [0, 1], we have the following asymptotic contributions:
1. The self–interaction term contributes
lim
N→∞
µNV
[
(∂iv
N,i
β )
2
]
=
pi2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2 + |∂xUβ(γq, µV )|2. (77)
2. The drift–interaction term contributes
lim
N→∞
µNV
[∑
k:k 6=i
∂kv
N,k
β ∂kv
N,i
β
]
=
pi2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2 +
∫
R
∂µUβ(γ
q, µV )(z)∂xUβ(z, µV )µV (dz).
3. The diffusion term contributes
lim
N→∞
µNV
[
− σ
2
2(N − 1)∆xv
N,i
β
]
= − pi
2β2σ2
6(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2.
Evidently, the local contributions cancel and so the N–Nash system (8) with (vN,kβ , λ
N,k
β )
N
k=1 converges
against (µNV )N≥2 along such index sequences to the master equation (40) at (γ
q, µV ) ∈ R× P22 (R).
Proof. First note by the Euler–Lagrange equation (71), we have
|∂xUβ(x, µV )|2 =
(
β
2
HµV (x)− x
2
)2
=
(
V ′(x)
2
− x
2
)2
=
V ′(x)2
4
+
x2
4
− xV
′(x)
2
, x ∈ supp(µV ),
Let X ∼ µNV . Then we can expand the singular cost term to compute
µNV
[
(∂iv
N,i
β )
2
]
=
β2
4
E
[
[(h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)]2 −
σ2
β
(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1
]
+ E
[
(X i)2
4
− β
2
X i · (h1 ∗ µN,iX )(X i) +
βσ2
4
(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(X i)
N − 1
]
N→∞→ β
2
4
· V
′(γq)2
β2
+
(γq)2
4
− β
2
· γ
qV ′(γq)
β
+
pi2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)mβ(γ
q)2
= |∂xUβ(γq, µV )|2 + pi
2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)mβ(γ
q)2,
where we have used (72), (74) and the analog of the calculation for (73). The limiting expression for
the diffusion term is immediate by (72). Finally, using these two limit calculations and the N–Nash
system (8) itself, we have
µNV
[∑
k:k 6=i
∂kv
N,k
β ∂kv
N,i
β
]
= µNV
[
σ2
2(N − 1)∆xv
N,i
β −
1
2
(∂iv
N,i
β )
2 +
(xi)2
8
+
β
2
(
3
4
β − σ2
)
(h2 ∗ µN,iX )(xi)
N − 1
]
− β
4
N→∞→ pi
2β2σ2
8(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2 − 1
2
|∂xUβ(γq, µV )|2 + (γ
q)2
8
+
β
2
(
3
4
β − σ2
)
· pi
2β
3(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2 − β
4
=
pi2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)mV (γ
q)2 +
(
(γq)2
8
+
pi2β2
8
mV (γ
q)2 − 1
2
|∂xUβ(γq, µV )|2 − β
4
)
.
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Since compactness of support implies µV has finite second moment by Ho¨lder’s inequality, we can use
Theorem 5.2, which confirms the pair (Uβ(x, µ),
β
4
) satisfies the master equation (40) on R×P22 (R).
Hence, the terms in the parentheses become the desired expression, completing the proof.
Remark 7.6. Besides rigorously connecting the N–Nash system (8) to the Voiculescu–Wigner
master equation (40), Theorem 7.5 is nontrivial because it establishes convergence at the location
γq. This fact confirms to some degree the intuition that players in the Dyson game really only care
about the population at their mean field “location” as N →∞.
Remark 7.7. We view the convergence in (77) as a localized version of the heuristic limit (1.4.4)
of Biane–Speicher [13] for relative free Fisher information (52) (cf. Remark 5.4). Their limit (1.4.4)
under the (closed loop Nash–optimal) Gaussian ensemble µNβ of (28) is actually not difficult to
compute directly using the argument of Remark 7.4. but we provide a more general computation
as the first item of the following corollary of our work, which confirms the analogous convergence
of equations for the auxiliary global problem associated to the open loop model.
Corollary 7.8. Assume β > σ2 > 0 and recall the definitions (69) of µNV and (71) of µV . Let
X¯ ∼ µV . Then we have the following asymptotic contributions:
1. The drift term contributes
lim
N→∞
µNV
[
1
N
|∇xWβ|2
]
=
pi2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)EmV (X¯)
2 +
1
2
∫
R
|∂µUβ(µV )(x)|2µV (dx)
2. The diffusion term contributes
lim
N→∞
µNV
[
− σ
2
2(N − 1) ·
1
N
∆xWβ
]
= − pi
2β2σ2
12(β − σ2)EmV (X¯)
2.
Consequently, the ergodic HJB equation (20) on WN associated to the open loop game converges
against (µNV )N≥2 to the Hamilton–Jacobi equation (42) on Wasserstein space P32 (R).
Remark 7.9. Although this section returns to a perspective found in the original MFG work
[50] of Lasry–Lions, the more modern account of Cardaliaguet–Delarue–Lasry–Lions [19] suggests
other ways to approach the mean field convergence problem. The two convergence notions in their
Theorem 2.13 are actually trivial for our prototype game: by design, we have vN,iβ (x) = Uβ(x
i, µN,ix )
for any N ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ N , so in their terminology the solutions vN,iβ (x) simply coincide with the
finite–dimensional projections of the so–called master field Uβ(x, µ). In fact, this discussion suggests
it is worth emphasizing an obvious, yet important, point: even if one establishes convergence of the
solutions of an N–Nash system to the solution of a master equation in some sense, one may still
need to check convergence of equations, as we have in Theorem 7.5, in order to confirm that this
mean field equation is indeed the correct analog of the N–Nash system.
To justify the passage to the limit even further, the notion of convergence of optimal trajectories
as in Theorem 2.15 of [19] is still an interesting question to pursue for the Dyson game. More
precisely, recall the quantile trajectories (γqt )t≥0 of (68) from Remark 6.6. Then one can endeavor
to identify the correct order of magnitude of “E supt∈[t0,T ] |X it−γqt |” for any 0 ≤ t0 ≤ T . We suspect
recent results on rigidity estimates and local relaxation time for Dyson Brownian motion will be
relevant; see, e.g., Theorem 2.4 of Bourgade–Erdo¨s–Yau [16] and Corollary 3.2 of Huang–Landon
[39] for the former, and Landon–Yau [47] for the latter.
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8 Dyson game on the circle
The insights into the Dyson game we identified above extend to similar classes of optimization
problems. To confirm this and to further emphasize the local nature of the Dyson game, we quickly
review the analogous results of this paper when players live in the periodic setting of the circle.
We will only review the governing equations and results, rather than articulate the probabilistic
representation of the game. To emphasize the analogy with the nonperiodic setting above, we freely
redefine notations for this section; for example, we now define for x 6= 2pik, k ∈ Z, (compare with
the definitions in (2))
h0(x) := log
∣∣∣sin [x
2
]∣∣∣ , h1(x) := 1
2
cot
[x
2
]
, h2(x) :=
1
4
sin−2
[x
2
]
,
but we will write WN := {x ∈ RN |x1 < · · · < xN < x1 + 2pi}.
Closed loop model
The closed loop model for Dyson Game on the circle will have the same ergodic N–Nash System
(8) but with state cost given by
FN,i(x) := C · (h2 ∗ µ
N,i
x )(x
i)
N − 1 =
C
4(N − 1)2
∑
k:k 6=i
1
sin2
[
Xi−Xk
2
] , x ∈WN , (78)
(compare with Sutherland’s model [65] and Spohn [64]). The next theorem gives the analog of
Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 8.1. Assume σ ≥ 0 and that the coefficient C of (78) satisfies C ≥ −σ4/6, so we
may write C = β
2
(3
4
β − σ2) for some β ∈ R. Define
vN,iβ (x) :=
{
−β
2
(h0 ∗ µN,ix )(xi) x ∈WN
+∞ otherwise , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (79)
and write λN,iβ :=
β2
32
[
1 + 2
N−1
]
. Then the pairs (vN,iβ (x), λ
N,i
β ) form a classical solution to the
associated N–Nash system on WN .
Proof. The proof follows by direct calculation just as for Proposition 3.4, but instead of (13), one
uses
2
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`: 6`=k,i
cotk` cotik =
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:` 6=k,i
cotk`
[
cotik− coti`] = ∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:` 6=i,k
cotik coti` +
(N − 1)(N − 2)
4
,
(80)
where we have abbreviated cotk` := h1(X
k −X`) = 1
2
cot
[
xk−x`
2
]
for k 6= `.
Open loop model
By the same argument as for Lemma 3.7, the open loop model of the Dyson game on the circle is
a potential game with the same ergodic HJB (20) but now with global cost function
FN(x) :=
C
2
·
N∑
i=1
(h2 ∗ µN,ix )(xi)
N − 1 , x ∈W
N . (81)
The next theorem gives the analog of Proposition 3.8.
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Proposition 8.2. Assume σ2 ≥ 0 and that the coefficient C of (81) satisfies C ≥ −σ4/4, so we
may write C = β
4
(β − 2σ2) for some β ∈ R. Define
Wβ(x) :=
{
− β
2(N−1)
∑
1≤k<`≤N log
∣∣∣sin [x`−xk2 ]∣∣∣ x ∈WN
+∞ otherwise
(82)
and write λNβ :=
β2
96
N+1
N−1 . Then the pair
(
Wβ(x), λ
N
β
)
forms a classical solution to the associated
open loop ergodic HJB equation on WN .
Proof. The proof follows by direct calculation just as for Theorem 3.8, but instead of (22), one uses
N∑
i=1
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`: 6`=i,k
cotik coti` = −N(N − 1)(N − 2)
12
, (83)
which follows by summing over i in the identity (80) (recall cotk` := 1
2
cot
[
xk−x`
2
]
for k 6= `).
Comparison of closed and open loop models
For β > σ2, the equilibrium dynamics (Xt)t≥0 will have components given by
dX it =
β
2
(h1 ∗ µN,iXt )(X it)dt+
σ√
N − 1dW
i
t =
β
4(N − 1)
∑
k:k 6=i
cot
[
X it −Xkt
2
]
dt+
σ√
N − 1dW
i
t ,
(84)
which by Theorem 3.1 of [26] remains in the interior WN for all t > 0. Let Π : R → T :=
R/(2piZ) ≈ [0, 2pi], x 7→ z = Π(x) = [x], be the quotient map to the equivalence class [x] of x. Then
the trajectories (Zt)t≥0 := (Π(Xt))t≥0 are ergodic on the compact space Π⊗N(WN) ⊂ TN .
Now the Verification Theorems 4.2, 4.5 for (Zt)t≥0 carry over essentially verbatim, and further
the optimal repulsions βclosed(C), βopen(C) of each model coincide exactly with the expressions (38)
of the nonperiodic Dyson game, which emphasizes the local nature of the model. We can also
compare and take limits of the costs:
λN,iβclosed(C) =
β2closed(C)
32
[
1 +
2
N − 1
]
N→∞→ βclosed(C)
2
32
, λNβopen(C) =
β2open(C)
96
N + 1
N − 1
N→∞→ βopen(C)
2
96
.
(85)
Mean–field equations
We now consider the mean field picture of the system (Zt)t≥0 = (Π(Xt))t≥0 in the compact space
T = [0, 2pi]. For analogs of the mean field functionals (39), (43), define
Uβ(x, µ) := −β
2
(h0 ∗ µ)(x) = −β
2
∫ 2pi
0
log
∣∣∣∣sin [x− y2
]∣∣∣∣µ(dy), (x, µ) ∈ T× Pp2 (T), 1 < p <∞,
and similarly define
Uβ(µ) := −β
4
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
log
∣∣∣∣sin [x− y2
]∣∣∣∣µ(dy)µ(dx), µ ∈ Pp2 (T), 1 < p <∞.
28
For analogs of the mean field equations (40), (42), we introduce the master equation∫ 2pi
0
∂µUβ(x, µ)(z)∂xUβ(z, µ)µ(dz) +
1
2
|∂xUβ(x, µ)|2 = pi
2β2
8
m(x)2 − λ, (86)
and the Hamilton Jacobi equation
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
|∂µUβ(µ)(x)|2µ(dx) =
∫ 2pi
0
pi2β2
24
m(x)2µ(dx)− λ. (87)
Notice in particular that the local population cost indicated by these equations is exactly the same
as for the nonperiodic versions (40), (42)!
Remark 8.3. The Hamilton–Jacobi equations (42), (87) have connections to quantum mechan-
ics. Indeed, the expression “pi2β2m3(x)” is related to the ground state energy per unit volume of
Sutherland’s model [65] and appears in Spohn’s works [63], [64] (in equation (1.5) and on pg.6,
respectively). It is also proportional to the integrand of free information; see Remark 5.4.
To sketch the proof that Uβ(x, µ) satisfies (86), we first define the Hilbert transform on the circle
by
Hµ(x) := p.v.
∫ 2pi
0
1
2
cot
(
x− y
2
)
µ(dy), x ∈ T.
We can formally compute using (41)
∂xUβ(x, µ) = −β
2
Hµ(x), ∂µUβ(x, µ)(z) =
β
4
cot
[
x− z
2
]
.
and so∫ 2pi
0
∂µUβ(x, µ)(z)∂xUβ(z, µ)µ(dz) = −β
2
4
H[mHm](x),
1
2
|∂xUβ(x, µ)|2 = β
2
8
(Hµ)2(x).
The result then follows upon using the product formula for the Hilbert transform on the circle
(compare with (49)):
pi2m(x)2 − 1
4
= (Hm)2(x)− 2H[m(Hm)](x), (88)
for any µ ∈ Pp(T), 2 ≤ p < ∞, with density m(x). To confirm Uβ(µ) solves the Hamilton–Jacobi
equation (87), we can formally compute
∂µUβ(µ)(x) = ∂xUβ(x, µ) = −β
2
Hµ(x)
Then we can integrate the product rule (88) to get∫ 2pi
0
(
pi2m(x)2 − 1
4
)
µ(dx) =
∫ 2pi
0
(Hm)2(x)µ(dx)−2
∫ 2pi
0
H[m(Hm)](x)µ(dx) = 3
∫ 2pi
0
(Hm)2(x)µ(dx),
which finally gives us
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
|∂µUβ(µ)(x)|2µ(dx) = β
2
8
∫ 2pi
0
(Hµ)2(x)µ(dx) =
β2
24
(∫ 2pi
0
pi2m(x)3dx− 1
4
)
,
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as required.
The invariant distribution in the mean field limit is the uniform distribution µ¯ with density
m¯(x) :=
1
2pi
1[0,2pi](x) (89)
in both cases. The total cost indicated by the mean field equations can be computed as expected
by (85):
pi2βclosed(C)
2
8
· m¯(x)2 = pi
2βclosed(C)
2
8
1
(2pi)2
=
βclosed(C)
2
32
= lim
N→∞
λN,iβclosed(C), x ∈ T,
and ∫ 2pi
0
pi2βopen(C)
2
24
m¯(z)3dz =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
pi2βopen(C)
2
24
1
(2pi)2
dz =
βopen(C)
2
96
= lim
N→∞
λNβopen(C).
Convergence of equations
Let Z be distributed as the invariant distribution of the periodic equilibrium dynamics (Zt)t≥0 that
are the image of the system (Xt)t≥0 in WN of (84) by the quotient map Π⊗N : RN → TN . Then
analogously to Proposition 7.1, but more simply as in the exchangeable setting of Remark 7.4, one
can combine the verification theorem for the open loop model with the identity (83) to compute
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E(h2 ∗ µN,iZ )(Zi)
N − 1 =
β
12(β − σ2) =
pi2β
3(β − σ2)Em¯(Z¯)
2,
where Z¯ ∼ m¯(z)dz of (89). Using the identity (83), we can further use symmetry to compute for
any sequence of indices i = i(N)
lim
N→∞
E
1
(N − 1)2
∑
k:k 6=i
∑
`:` 6=i,k
1
2
cot
[
Zi − Zk
2
]
· 1
2
cot
[
Zi − Z`
2
]
= − 1
12
.
The analog of Corollary 7.8 then follows in the same manner.
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